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THE NEW PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION

THE NEW PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION
By

T

JOHN

M.

GAUS*

problem of administration has changed during the last few
decades. It is now more complex and difficult to comprehend. Yet it is essential that we try to understand it in view
of the fact that the functions of government have increased, and
promise to increase further. The failure of citizens to appreciate the changed nature and essence of administration is in
part responsible for some inadequacies in our organization of
administration and the way in which the organization is operated;
and it is revealed in some measure also in the difficulties which
courts, lawyers, and officials exhibit in treating of the question
of administrative law. We shall find how administration is changed
if we examine briefly what other factors have caused its development. Those factors include our party system, our legislatures,
and the problems which confront both.
If by a party we mean a group of citizens who are united
in part by some principles of political action and who desire to
see those principles put into force by electing members of the
party to public office we shall be unable, I think, to admit that
most of the present so-called parties are parties at all. They
tend to be, rather, coalitions of parties. They avoid adopting
definite principles and programs in the hope of holding together
the minor groups who have such programs and which would split
apart if a common group of principles was stressed. As a consequence the representatives of these coalitions who are elected
to the legislatures have the burden of actually framing concrete
proposals into law, and only in the broadest sense and at the most
infrequent intervals can it be said that the party as we know it
to-day really formulates policy.
Unfortunately we do not find the procedure and organization
of our legislatures so constituted that responsible leadership is
readily apparent. There are two chambers, each with its own
procedural and committee systems and leaders. Furthermore, in
the United States there is no constitutional relationship with the
executive branch of government looking toward a satisfactory
solution of the difficult problem of responsibility for policy and
HE
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action. As a result legislation must be largely a matter of compromise and of give and take. Consequently we find a tendency
to leave difficult problems to administrative agencies for solution because of a lack of information on the part of the legislature, because of a lack of executive leadership, or because of the
intricacies of the subject.
In fact the type of problem now attacked in our government
forces us to devolve greater discretion upon the administrative
organization. In a simpler agrarian society functions might be
few and not intricate. Today our problems are hardly capable
of solution by statute. They are not met by party platforms. In
the legislatures there is therefore a recognition of the sheer
necessity of establishing a permanent and expert agency which
shall apply a general principle which shall be set by the legislature to the specific situations discovered by the officials.' The
general principle must be interpreted by rules and regulations and
by special orders. In this way, presumably, the policy of the
legislature is carried out. Actually, the administrative agency
itself makes a policy because of the sheer failure of preceding
agencies-parties and legislatures-to perform their primary functions.
Nor can one afford to overlook the decline in the public estimation of legislative action. It is not alone in the United States that
various groups and many individuals express a sharp criticism or
an even more revealing boredom with our legislatures. The same
tendency has been revealed in England in assaults on "the servile
state," and the "discredited state ;-12 in France by administrative
syndicalism and regionalism and the criticism of what is termed
"deputantism ;-3 in Italy by the Facist movement, with its contemptuous dismissal of parliamentary authority by its leader Mussolini ;4 in Germany by the Hitler-Ludendorff attempt at a Fascist
movement, by the voting of wide powers to the chancellor, and
the movements toward direct action both on the left and the
right; while in Russia another phase of the same tendency is seen
in the rejection of parliamentary democracy in favor of the dic'See Carr, Delegated Legislation, Cambridge University Press; also
the debate in the U.S. Senate on the "flexible" provisions of the Tariff
Act 2of 1922 on August 10 and 11, 1922.
Phrases applied by Hilaire Belloc and Ernest Barker.
3
The extensive literature on these developments is conveniently introduced in Mr. H. J. Laski's essay on recent movements in the French civil
service in his Authority in the Modern State, Yale University Press.
4Carleton Beals, Rome or Death, The Century Company,--an interesting, if somewhat poorly organized account of the movement.
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tatorship of the more aggressive leaders of a group. There are,
too, more peaceful expressions of a positive policy of experimenting with new schemes of social representation as represented
by the Guild Socialist lM.ovement in England, the Industrial Parliament of reconstruction days, and best of all in the swing of
German business and industrial interests and trade union organizations -toward the development of the Economic Council and the
district and local councils. 5
While there have been some interesting experiments in this
country in the field of new forms of policy-expressing organizations they have received relatively little attention. Broadly speaking, we have been too concerned with being critical of the extension of governmental regulation or the withdrawal of governmental regulation to apply any fresh and fruitful thinking to the
real problem of getting things done. It is significant, however,
that under pressure of war needs business was able to turn
from fighting further attempts at regulations of the peace time
type to the more positive creative efforts to do its own organizing
on a national scale in order to formulate its own policies and
work with the government departments on mutual problems. The
largest experiments in this field were undertaken by and through
the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board,
and are fortunately recorded for the public in Grosvenor Clarkson's interesting Industrial America in the World War. Much
less known are the most interesting experiments made by the War
Labor Policies Board to secure the development of a representative
council in certain of the great industries, which councils would
speak for their industries in all matters of labor policy., If the
energy which people representing various interests put into
negative criticism and fault finding could be directed in some such
efforts to reform and reorganize their own organizations in order
to deal with their own problems, it is probable that there would
be less insistence on the extension of governmental regulation of
business and industry or industrial courts and the like. In default
of the development of functional organization to deal with functional problems the administrative agency of regulation or control
has come.
5
The Guild Socialist literature is large, although the accomplishment
is small. G. D. H. Cole is clearest expounder of it. See H. Finer's useful account of the German movements in Representative Government and
of Industry, Allen and Unwin, London.
a Parliament
6
The documents on these movements are now embalmed in the files
of the war records,-presumably those of the U. S. Dept. of Labor.
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Due to the failure of issues and programs to become carefully
defined by the parties and party leaders, due to the lack of satisfactory conditions of leadership, organization, procedure and
debate and study by legislatures, due to the new type of problemtechnical, detailed, involved, requiring' special knowledge and
expertise-and finally due to the decline of public confidence in
legislators and yet the failure of social groups to organize to
deal with their own difficulties, the new problem of administration
is here. The new administration includes a wide share of policy
formulation; it requires a large measure of discretion on the
part of the civil servant; it claims wide exemption from judicial
review of its findings of fact; in brief, we are seeing a development somewhat akin to the rise of administration in the days when
the Tudors and the great monarchs were welding together the
modern national state. A changing social order threw aside the
instruments and tools which were no longer adequate. It sought
a new instrument-more flexible, more adaptable, quicker, keener.
The rising middle classes of the early days of discoveries, widening commerce and the new nationalism found an instrument to
their hand in the monarchy.7 The modem community of an intricate economic order, an urban social scheme, a general development of elementary education and a wide sharing, of the
possibilities of political power, confronted by difficult and
puzzling problems of conservation of natural and human resources turns to the new kind of administration as its instrument. Its parties and its legislatures in despair place upon these
agencies heavy burdens.
Congress, for example, may determine upon a policy of developing our rivers as a part of a system of water transportation. Yet these rivers are crossed by bridges that also are an
important part of our transportation system. Obviously Congress
is incapable of inserting in the law just what regulations as to
number and height of spans each bridge in the United States
should have. Nor can it lay down any really helpful rule which
will apply at once to the needs, let us say, of the Charles River
and the San Joaquin. It therefore gives to the Engineering Corps
of the War Department the duty of determining "unreasonable
obstructions" to navigation and the supervision of their removal.8
7Pollard's Factors in Modern History and Einstein's Tudor Ideals
contain pictures of the significance of the Tudor monarchy which are suggestive reading to contemporaries of Mussolini and Lenin.
8
See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, (1907) 204 ,U.S. 364, 51
L.Ed. 523, 27 S.C.R. 367.
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Again Congress may establish certain tariff rates but be fearful
that at some future time, perhaps when it is not in session, a
foreign state may also establish prohibitive rates on our agricultural products. It therefore fixes other reciprocal rates which
the president is left free to apply when he determines, as a matter
of fact, that foreign states have established prohibitive rates.
Here, of course, a policy is fixed by Congress but contingent upon
the finding of a certain state of affairs to exist by the president. 9
Suppose Congress commits the nation to -the general policy
of forest conservation. Large forest preserves are established.
But how shall they be administered? Shall grazing be permitted in their meadows and when and under what conditions?
And shall similar policies be maintained for all the preserves?
Confronted with this difficulty the' problem is shunted upon the
forest service which must make the regulations. 10
Now in all these cases the point at which legislation begins
and administration ends is most difficult to determine. One can
assert, in any event, that we can see here the steady growth in
importance of administration. Anyone who is at all familiar with
the type of statute so loved by Legislatures-crammed with detail, with concessions to special interests but overriding many
considerations of effective enforcement-must agree that this new
method of self-denial by the Legislature is better. To be sure
it is not so much self-denial as sheer necessity.
We may have a situation in which the Legislature, confronted
by a complex social problem does not presume to offer an absolute
solution but creates an agency peculiarly qualified by reason of
knowledge and experience to deal wholly with the problem. The
Pennsylvania Legislature cannot go in person to inspect each
mine to determine how wide the pillars of coal separating various
mines should be to prevent flooding or caving. It can, however,
leave such determination wisely to a board composed of mining
engineers representing the adjoining properties with a state mine
inspector."
An even broader delegation of policy formulation is found
in the granting of power by Congress to the Interstate Commerce
Commission to permit greater charges for short hauls than long.
OField v. Clark, (1892)

143 U.S. 649, 36 L.Ed. 294, 12 S.C.R. 495.

'oUnited States v. Grimaud, (1911)
S.C.R. 480.

200 U.S. 506, 55 L.Ed. 563, 31

"lPlymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1914) 232 U.S. 531, 58 L.Ed.
713. 34 S:C.R. 359.
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Here the delegation of legislative power is nearly complete. While
the statute expresses the obvious desire of the national Legislature to establish a policy of removal of special privilege by
means of governmental regulation it is equally obvious that it felt
unable to provide by statute for the many situations which could
be appraised properly only by an expert commission. Chief
Justice White in writing an opinion concerning this problem un12
fortunately avoids the real issue of delegation here, and in his
decision summarily crams new factors into old categories of
"legislative" and "executive functions."' 3
There is another case which admirably illustrates the new
problem of administration which is emerging clearer from the
judicial haze of the situations just described. The state of Ohio
gave to a commission the duty of reviewing and censoring moving
pictures. The law in which the Legislature established this primary policy contained, as a standard of censorship which the
commission was instructed to follow, the words "moral, educational or amusing and harmless character."
Now it is obvious that there can be a very wide range of
interpretation concerning these words. Does this not constitute
a palpable delegation of legislative power? Have we not gone a
long way from the mere "filling in of details" left by law to
the executive in earlier cases? How does the court face this?
As a matter of fact Mr. Justice McKenna writing the decision
14
in Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Connission,
(1915) remarked:
"Undoubtedly the Legislature must declare the policy of the
law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given
cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power
to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and
principles apply."

Having paid this lip service to the traditional separation of
powers idea he goes on to meet the claim that those principles are
so vague as to constitute a delegation of legislative power:
"The statute by its provisions guards against such variant
judgments and its terms like other general terms, get precision
from the sense and experience of men and become certain and
useful guides in reasoning and conduct
"Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly
relies."
12Intermountain Rate Cases, (1914) 234 U.S. 476, 58 L.Ed. 1408, 34
986.
S.C.R.
13
See the note on this case in 28 Harv. L. Rev. 110.
14Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Commission, (1915) 236
U.S. 230, 59 L.Ed. 552, 35 S.C.R. 387.
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And then there is the final practical argument.
"If this were not so, the many administrative agencies created
by the state and national governments would be denuded of their
utility and government in some of its most important exercises
become impossible."
No recent case, I think, brings out in such bold relief our
situation. The Legislature must delegate, qualified only by the
most general of pietistic phrases, policy-determining as well as
executing power to special administrative agencies. Otherwise
social control through the government would be impossible today.
And those administrative agencies must develop their own standards through their "sense and experience," pragmatically.
The suggestion that the present tendency toward developing a
swifter and more flexible type of administration is comparable
to the development of the Tudor monarchy suggests, unhappily,
the Star Chamber. The phrase now frequently appears in use,
particularly where a few are gathered together to discuss the
release of administration from judicial control. The Supreme
Court itself in a recent case apparently attempts to pull back.
In the majority opinion in the case of Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough,'5 there is plainly a withdrawal toward a
wider extension of judicial review of rate making, while the
majority opinion as expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis maintains
that the question (here one of valuation) is essentially one of
fact which should be left to the commission. Commenting on this
case, Professor Nathan Isaacs remarks :16
"Whatever one may think of this latest case, it throws light
on one feature of our judicial history, the power of the court
to come back and to take a hand in the decision of matters supposed to have been surrendered by them to the administrative.
And it is interesting to see how carefully in its advance the
court retraces the very steps it took in its retreat. It now refuses
to see the discretion element in such a process as valuation and
to its view the finding of the commission on the subject before
it assumes the guise, for the time being, of a 'judicial question."'
Dean Pound has remarked that in a modern state, executive
justice, beyond what is involved in a proper balance between
law and administration, is an evil, even if sometimes a necessary
will be
evil. "It has always been, and in the long run it always
17
crude and as variable as the personalities as officials.
I5(1920) 253 U.S. 287, 64 L.Ed. 908, 40 S.C.R. 527.
16Review of Administrative Findings, 30 Yale L. Jour. 781,--a very
able survey of the subject.
1755 Am. L. Reg. 137.
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It is here certainly pertinent to remark that judges, too, have
personalities. Yet it is true that the reaction against administrative power has set in, and it is also true that reaction is in large
measure because of the enormous extension of governmental
authority during the war. The interference with expression of
opinion, with business and industry, the selective service planthese are examples of the attempt at regimentation of a whole
nation. The same tendency to withdraw from state control and
to reduce administrative agencies to the wider scrutiny of the
judiciary is seen in England, especially after the high water mark
of the Arlidge Case. The London Nation (a disciple of the
Liberal tradition, it is true) stated editorially on March 17, 1923:
"It is an important characteristic of our time that the executive power of the state should have extended, within recent years,
to boundaries far beyond what were deemed legitimate by the
classic doctrines of the last age. In the realm of delegated legislation, there is much to be said for the development; though the
famous Arlidge Case18 shows the danger that this power may be
used to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. That danger is even
more apparent in the exercise of the prerogative by the government."
Similarly Mr. C. K. Allen, discussing the significance of
some recent English cases in which the court had recognized the
finality of the acts of the administrative authority, entitles his
article, Bureaucracy Triumphant. 9
Mr. William D. Guthrie in his presidential address before the
New York-State Bar Association on January 19, 1923, remarked:
"Although the principle of the separation of governmental
powers was long observed in this country and generally recognized as a sound governmental policy, we must perceive that it
is being gradually undermined in national and state affairs as a
result of the impatience with the delay involved in being just
according to law."
This is, perhaps, a fair expression of how the lawyer feels toward the developments we have noted. One should add that Mr.
Guthrie supplemented his statements with the following remark:
"The theory of regulation by commissions is inherently sound
and in practice necessary.' Legislative bodies such as Congress
or our state legislatures cannot act in these matters as intelligently
and efficiently as a board or commission of practical experts
familiar with the business to be controlled or regulated."
In brief, despite reluctance to permit the final control to
escape from the court, sheer necessity requires a large share of
18[1915] A.C. 120; see the notes on this case in the Political Quarterly,
February 1915, p. 141 and 28 Harv. L. Rev. 198.
19 Quarterly Review, October 1923.
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power being conferred upon administrative agencies by legislatures; and the kind of technical problem raised often makes it
difficult for the court to review administration effectively.
Perhaps the latest example of the continuing force of these
facts is that offered by the Tariff Act of 1922. I have lready
referred to the Senate debates on the provisions for a "flexible
tariff"-that is, the conferring of power upon the president by
sections 315 and 316 to increase rates within 50 per cent of the
value of the merchandise or to change its classification, provided
certain specified conditions enumerated in the act were met. This
section was bitterly attacked in the Senate on the ground that
it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
executive. A careful reading of the debate leads one to wonder,
indeed, if Mr. Guthrie's observations concerning the soundness
of the principle of the separation of governmental powers are entirely justified. Senators frankly admitted that the Congress was
not able to deal with the conditions affecting the tariff because
of the rapidity with which those conditions changed and the
technical problems surrounding them. At the same time Congress
desired to enact a general policy of protection of American goods
from foreign competition. The Senate Finance Committee submitted in support of its advocacy of the sections a memorandum
on their constitutionality by Judge De Vries of the customs
court of appeals in which the outstanding cases are summarized
and a very interesting argument made.
It is interesting to notice that this argument was received
coldly by the Democratic Senators, but welcomed by the Republican Senators who were supporting the new act. President
Harding himself sent a letter advocating the plan. In a letter
dated at the White House on August 11, 1922, and addressed
to Senator McCumber he stated that
"It has seemed to me that the varying conditions following
the World War make it expressly essential that we have this
means of adapting our tariffs to meet the new conditions. Moreover I believe that it is a highly constructive and progressive step
in retaining the good and eliminating the abuses which grow
up under our tariff system."
Senator McCumber, the chairman of the finance committee
which introduced the proposal, with other Republican Senators
urged strongly the constitutionality of the sections as based upon
the memorandum of Judge DeVries. Senator Edge went so far
as to assert that the power given the president would be more
wisely used than it could be used by the Congress itself.
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"Here the members of the Senate and the other House, representing as they do certain subdivisions of the country are approached on every hand

.

.

.

to particularly look after the

interests of this or that manufacturing industry or other organiza. . The president is president of the entire country.
tion.
. So any decisions made by the president of the United
t..
-States would

.

.

.

be to a great extent removed from sec-

tional influence and control."
On the other hand Senators Underwood, Simmons, Walsh, and
Reed attacked the section on the ground that it delegated the
power of Congress to the president. Said Senator Underwood:
"It will be the executive mind of the government that will
hereafter regulate the amount of taxes at the customhouse rather
than the legislative determination of the matter. Therefore, it is
clear to me that these provisions of the bills are not within the
terms of the constitution of the United States."
One obvious fact emerges from the debate. While the opposing sides were claiming to interpret the constitution correctly,
by a curious coincidence the disagreement concerning the constitutional question seemed to correspond to the division between the
two parties on tariff lines. Those who desired a revision downward desired to interpret the section as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Those who desired the flexible
adjustment of tariff rates in order to prevent competition from
foreign goods under conditions unfavorable to the American merchants and manufacturers found that the provision was constitutional, and brought forward a memorandum of the judge of
the customs court of appeals in support of their claims. To the
layman it would appear that this new administration, whose
limited release from judicial scrutiny and control and whose
widening discretion is viewed with alarm by the groups who are
traditionally and professionally interested in"that control, becomes
an issue chiefly where the desirability or the lack of desirability
of the particular function to be administered is called into question. Unquestionably the courts, for exampfe, have been more
lenient with administration in its protection of public health and
order than they have with administration in the regulation of business and industry. They grant more power to administrative officials in deportation or exclusion proceedings than they would
permit in the regulation of housing in the interest of a city plan.
And it is not unworthy of attention that part of the agitation for
administrative tribunals for such matters as workmen's compensation cases grew out of impatience not with the slowness of the
courts in establishing justice but with their obsolete methods and
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concepts. The ancient advice of "reform in order that you may
preserve" should be considered by those who deplore the extension of administrative discretion. Mr. Warren Pillsbury, in his
suggestive articles on Administrative Tribunals 0 remarks that:
"Until American civil procedure has been brought to a state
of efficiency by thoroughgoing reformation, as demanded from
time to time by leading jurists and as accomplished in England
during the last fifty years, the field of the administrative tribunal
will be uncertain. The tendency will continue to transfer from
the courts to the administrative officers further functions heretofore exercised by the judiciary. The fixing of rates for common
carriers and trial of workmen's compensation claims are but instances of such movement. With, however, a simplified judicial
procedure and greater judicial efficiency, the tide may turn in the
opposite direction.
"In the meantime, administrative tribunals have their place.
Some are old and well established; others are newer and on the
borderline between executive and judicial dispensation of justice.
. . . Care should be taken, however, to see that some judicial

review be had in nearly all cases of decisions of such bodies.
Such power of review should be of limited scope and speedy in
determination, as by certiorari and other prerogative writs, but
not so broad as to cripple the efficiency of the executive departments concerned by the application of what is popularly called'
'judicial red tape.'"
If the considerations of judicial decisions and of legislative
debates are frequently barren in their use of such categories as
"delegation of legislative power," "administrative determination of
fact" and "judicial review of questions of law," the student of
administration on the other hand can show some substantial progress in the field of control of administration by means which are
other than judicial. I refer chiefly to the great advances of the
past few years in administrative control over administration and
legislative control over administration. These are both almost
entirely neglected by the legal profession in their considerations of
the subject, and yet it is important to recall that the courts are by
no means the only bulwark of liberties and effective response to
the needs of a social order. This latter attitude is well expressed
21
by Judge Cuthbert Pound of the New York court of appeals.
"Mr. Justice Holmes said in an address before Harvard Law
School Association, February 13, 1923: 'The United States would
not come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
2036 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 583.
2110 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 409,--an article entitled, Constitutional As-

pects of American Administrative Law.
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Congress void . . .I do not think the Union would be imperiled

if we could not make the declaration as to the laws of the several
states.' With this declaration I think the great majority of jurists,
historians and statesmen have little sympathy but if that end comes,
the United States and the several states will enjoy a republican
form of government only so long as the sovereign will is guided
by reason."
It is difficult to disagree with the final generality, of course,
whatever it may mean. Yet one can urge that the despairing note
so frequently struck as above when other agencies of government
than the courts are concerned might be restrained if a better proportioned and informed attitude might be taken. In the past.
few years this country. has seen a tremendous development of
interest in improved organization of administration as well as
some substantial accomplishments in developing responsible administrative leadership. We have also seen a great development
in better methods of classification of personnel, recruitment, salary
standardization, promotional and retirement systems and similar
problems of personnel. New forms of legislative control have
been adopted and developed. Finally administrative control over
administration through personnel, financial, purchasing and audit
agencies has been extended or introduced. These movements, are
registered by the establishment of innumerable organizations for
government research and by the work of such journals as the
National Municipal Review. It is doubtful if for any problem
of government-judicial, constitutional, elections or any other, we
can show such a mass of substantial achievement during the past
twenty years as we can for the problem of administration. The
overhead organization of administration has been thoroughly discussed in such reports as that of the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Commission, the New York State Reconstruction Commission, the various studies-purely descriptive-of the Institute for
Government Research at Washingion, and, in England, in the
Report on Machinery of Government of the Ministry of Reconstruction. The recent developments in the field of administrative
reorganization in New York state under Governor A. E. Smith,
in Pennsylvania under Governor Pinchot, in Illinois under Governor Lowden, in Massachusetts following the Constitutional Convention of 1917, in Tennessee and in other states are significant.
At the present time Minnesota has an interim committee of the
House engaged upon a study of the problem locally. The spread
of the city manager plan is further evidence of the same tendency.
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Similarly in the field of personnel there has been great development of improved classification of employments, standardization of positions with qualifications, salaries, and work conditions,
improved methods of examination and recruitment, including promotions, and the adoption of adequate retirement arrangements.
The better methods of legislative control over administration
which the new budget systems provide in this country are known
even beyond the narrow circle of students of such matters. The
national budget plan, as a matter of fact, followed after plans
already adopted and in operation in many commonwealths and
cities-notably those of Maryland and Massachusetts and Illinois,
among the commonwealths.
But the most interesting developments in the field of control
come from within the administrative organizations themselves.
The person who talks so glibly of the spendthrift character of
administration, the spoils system and similar evils as contrasted
with the spotless purity and high technical qualifications of the
courts would do well at least to acquaint himself with the more
recent control devices of such a state as Massachusetts with its
division of civil service and its commission on administration and
finance and similar agencies in other states. By establishing a
continuous scrutiny and survey of all matters of finance, personnel, purchasing, printing, construction, and similar fields of
administration the executive organization of the state comes to
exercise a control over itself in the interest of more effective
work. In the government at Washington an interesting example of
this movement is seen in the bureau of the budget. In fact the
present danger is a too great emphasis on economy and centralized
control in the interest of cutting down expenditure which may
injure the services and defeat its own purpose.
In brief, judicial control is only one form of control over
administration, and not necessarily the most effective. Legislative control through committee investigation, budget scrutiny, as
well as actual statute provisions aims to keep the policy and application of the administrative departments in tune with that of the
majority control of the legislative body. The overhead control of
the administrative organization itself-the British treasury, the
French ministry of finance, the United States bureau of the budget, the many state departments of finance or efficiency and civil
service and purchasing-is exercised in the interest of more
efficient utilization of the powers and resources of the govern-
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ment. Finally judicial control aims to protect the rights of citizens from illegal acts of the administration. As we have seen,
this last form of control becomes difficult with the expansion of
administration into fields where expert knowledge and wide discretion are essential if the wheels of government are to turn at all,
and it is difficult also because with the extension of governmental
regulation and control there is a constantly increasing opposition
from the interests controlled who seek to turn back the movement
by appeals to constitutional limitations devised for a simpler
agrarian society of small population and large natural resources.
What the student of administration might well urge upon his
professional colleague of the law is a wider perspective in attacking the problem, a perspective which will at least include some
consideration of the causes of the new administration, and of the
other forms of administrative control which have recently been so
widely developed. Whether there is still another way out of the
difficulties in our present system, a way out suggested by the
success of the French council of state as an expert court of review of administrative cases applying a special administrative
law, is a fascinating subject of inquiry. Certainly there have
developed in this country several administrative tribunals in such
fields as public lands, customs, claims, immigration proceedings,
as well as the short-lived Commerce Court. And even Professor
Dicey, whose views on the subject were expressed in his The Law
of the Constitution has since admitted that it is not entirely clear
22
that there is no administraiive law in England.
The new administration, which has emerged so suddenly that
many of us are still unaware of its implications or problems or
challenges, nevertheless was .foreseen by the shrewdest of Victorian students of politics. Walter Bagehot, in his Biographical
Studies, gave us the portraits of some great administrators. And
he defined a great administrator 23 in terms which we today can
recognize as applicable to our situation:
"Ordinary administrators are very common; every-day life
requires and produces every-day persons. But a really great
22
There is an interesting literature on the French system. The best
articles readily available to the American reader are those of Duguit, 29
Pol. Sci. Quart. 385; Dicey, op. cit. ch. 12; Sait, The Government and
Politics of France, ch. 11. On the subject of American tribunals the
articles of T. R. Powell are excellent. They are found in 1 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 583; 24 Harv. L. Rev. 268, 333, 441, and 22 Harv. L. Rev. 360;
Ghose, Comparative Administrative Law, Calcutta 1919, contains an excellent
23 discussion of the American, English and French systems.
William Pitt.
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231

administrator thinks not only of the day but of the morrow;
does not only what he must but what he wants; is eager to extirpate every abuse, and on the watch for every improvement; is on a
level with the highest political thought of his time, and persuades
his age to be ruled according to it-to permit him to embody it in
policy and in laws. Administration in this large sense includes
legislation, for it is concerned with the far-seeing regulation of
future conduct, as well as with the limited management of the
present. Great dictators are doubtless rare. in political history;
but they are not more so than great administrators, such as we
have just defined them. It is not easy to manage any age; it is not
easy to be on a level with the highest thought of any age; but to
manage that age according to that highest thought is among the
most arduous tasks of the world. The intellectual character of a
dictator is noble but simple; that of a great administrator is also
complex."
Modern administration as defined here is too complex, then,
to admit of simple solutions for its problems. It may even be
difficult to define what administration is. Certainly the courts
have had their troubles at it.

